Thoughts on Syria, Kosovo, Ric Grenell and Milei's Argentina

Welcome to my first Substack post!

A few months ago, over a decent bottle on a balmy Belgrade evening, my friend Ian Bancroft gave me a bit of a bollocking. Politely worded and sympathetic in tone, it was a bollocking nonetheless. He charged that I haven’t been writing enough and therefore risk “losing my voice” on issues I care about. In truth, he’s right - and that’s why I’ve set up this Substack.

I have no clear plan for how often I intend to write on this platform or what I intend to focus on, other than to offer some personal observations about what’s happening in the world. I hope you find these thoughts of interest and I’d welcome your comments.

Anyway, here’s some thoughts to kick off 2025…

SYRIA: finding darkness in the light

Ultimately, I don’t know what’s going to happen in Syria. Syria also isn’t Afghanistan. Deeply profound observations, I know – but stick me with for a moment.

Ever since Bashar al-Assad’s ousting, bien pensant commentators have stampeded to try and draw conclusions from every announcement made by Abu Mohammad al-Julani’s interim government. The consensus view appears to be one of “better the devil you know”, with people freely recognising Assad’s myriad crimes, yet expressing concern about the path Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) may lead Syria down in the years to come.

Scepticism of HTS is well-warranted. They have a record of frankly terrifying pronouncements on religious matters and their decision to introduce changes to the national curriculum that emphasise Islamic teachings over science are clearly a retrograde step.

However, the efforts being made in some quarters quasi-rehabilitate the Assad regime’s image are absurd. Yes, he provided a modicum of stability in recent years – but at what cost?

The fact that Assad’s Alawite-led regime provided a degree of protection for Syrian Christians is not a trump card that excuses decades of brutality and torture. Similarly, the free availability of alcohol in the country does not justify the danger to Mediterranean security posed by the Russian Navy’s presence in Latakia. Keeping the lights on in Damascus does not vindicate inviting Vladimir Putin to reduce the handsome cities of Aleppo and Homs to rubble.

Comparisons between Syria and Afghanistan are similarly tedious.

Syria has long been a multi-religious state while Afghanistan is close to 85% Sunni and almost entirely homogenously Islamic. Afghanistan is a mountainous and predominantly rural nation, yet Syria’s population live largely in cities. The role of primary and higher education for both men and women are intrinsic to Syrian society while, even pre-Taliban, literacy rates in Afghanistan stood at under 40% overall. Syrians have long travelled to, traded with and been familiar with the culture of the western world in a way Afghan society, outside urban centres, never has.

As they seek to govern, the transitional government in Syria must navigate the realities of an educated, multi-ethnic, internationally connected, and aspirational society that will not easily accept political Islam as the country’s sole creed.

There are some initial signs that al-Julani himself may recognise this. His decision to hold open dialogue with the very same Christian leaders who were brutalised by HTS-aligned Islamists is an important step. In war – particular civil wars – the logic of “to the victor, the spoils” would ordinarily have meant the launch of waves of oppression against perceived enemies, yet this has not happened. Indeed, the predominant images coming from Syria are those of unalloyed delight that the Assad years are finally over.

Time will how sincere HTS and al-Julani are about rebuilding Syria in a pluralistic manner – but, for now, we can afford ourselves a degree of cautious optimism.

KOSOVO: at a dead end with Albin Kurti

Next month, Kosovo will go to the polls. The result is a foregone conclusion: the current Vetëvendosje (VV) government will be re-elected. With that, we’re likely to see another four years of stalled progress on the normalisation of relations with Serbia or Kosovo’s own path to Euro-Atlantic integration.

VV’s political proposition is both appealing and intangible. I often think of Kurti’s appeal as similar to Jeremy Corbyn’s for those on the left - idealistic, passionate and professing to occupy the moral high ground, yet wholly lacking in political or economic practicality.

Unlike Corbyn, Kurti was able to decisively win a general election back in 2021; chiefly as a result of the public rejection of years of corrupt grand coalitions whose rank clientelism was akin to dynastic feudalism. His parliamentary majority will also see VV become the first Kosovo government to survive a full term without collapsing into ignominious squabbles.

The unspoken question that needs to be asked, though, is: what have Kurti and VV actually achieved in the last four years?

VV does deserve credit for making some progress in reducing corruption, even if administrative and public procurement processes main deeply flawed. On a broader economic note, though, the failure of the government to advance the privatisation of assets like the postal and telecoms network has left the country reliant on outdated infrastructure.

The issue of diplomacy - both externally and towards its own national minorities - is where Kosovo under Kurti and VV has really failed.

First, let’s look the issue of the Serbian minority.

While I fully recognise that VV was elected on a platform of adopting an uncompromising stance towards Serbia - after all, Vetëvendosje means “self-determination” in Albanian - this sentiment has started to negatively impact ethnic Serb citizens of Kosovo rather than Serbia itself. As an example, VV have recently taken action to prevent Serbian banking and postal services operating in the north of Kosovo, complicating life for many with family in Serbia and causing deep resentment among local Serbs.

Second, Kurti’s refusal to move forward with the creation of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM) is weakening his hand with the US and Brussels.

The ASM, he argues, would undermine Kosovo’s statehood by allowing Serbs to operate a shadow state and risk a move towards a Republika Srpska-style entity as soon in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This argument might have some validity if it were not for the fact the body would not possess any revenue-raising powers; rending it little more than a political fig leaf.

One could argue it’s unfair to criticise Kurti for failing to implement the ASM given it is an output from the 2013 Brussels Agreement signed under the premiership of his bête noire Hashim Thaci. If Kosovo wishes to be taken seriously by the EU as an independent state, it can no more cherry-pick its adherence to diplomatic and legal accords than the UK could during its exit from the EU. One a student leader, always a student leader; Kurti seems unwilling to accept that compromise rather than stubbornness is sometimes needed in diplomacy.

Kosovo is an independent state. It is for its leaders to decide how it is governed. Realpolitik ought to suggest, however, that the continued alienation of the EU and US is an unwise position for a state so heavily reliant on external assistance – be it in the form of financing or visa-free travel accords.

As always, I wish Kosovo well I see no reason to be optimistic about a second VV term.

RICHARD GRENELL: the real Secretary of State?

Among the slew of ambassadorial appointments coming from the incoming US administration, it interesting to see that Trump has appointed Ric Grenell as his envoy for “special missions”. I think this will be a more interesting and meaningful appointment than initially meets the eye.

For US presidents to appoint envoys is nothing new. Most have unremarkable terms and are quickly forgotten (the exception being former US Senator George Mitchell who, as Bill Clinton’s envoy to Northern Ireland, chaired the talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement).

As the US Senate-confirmed Ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term, Grenell took leaves of absence from Berlin to serve as Acting Director of National Intelligence and to lead peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia. In both cases, these roles reported into Trump personally; avoiding Senate scrutiny, side-stepping State Department hierarchies and leaning into personal loyalties.

Grenell was rumoured to be a finalist for the role of Secretary of State, which ultimately went to US Senator Marco Rubio and whose work over many years on democratisation issues globally has been impressive. He shouldn’t be disappointed, though. The creation of the “special missions” post for Grenell arguably allows him greater latitude than would be afforded to him by the diplomatic constraints of the State Department.

Looking at what’s on the docket foreign policy-wise, a special presidential envoy that both reports directly to Trump and has the implied power to corral the diplomatic networks of State, the military strength of Defence and commercial and trade power of Commerce and Treasury on everything from Taiwan to the Middle East is a powerful one. In the unconventional world of Donald Trump, where conventions are made to be broken and reporting lines upended, it also makes a lot of sense.

On the face of it, Rubio is the senior man. He’s the Secretary of State and he’s the one with the seat at the cabinet table. But if you want my prediction as to Trump’s really going to trust over the next four years to drive the aspects of his foreign policy most important to him, it’s Grenell I’d be looking at.

ARGENTINA: Milei’s plan seems to be working

I’m writing this from the beautiful island of Florianopolis in the south of Brazil. Few places can match its natural beauty, fresh air and even fresher seafood.

I’ve been coming here for years at peak tourist season and the place is usually dominated by domestic tourists. Not this year. The whole place – every hotel, restaurant, bar and beach – is packed to the rafters with Argentinian tourists. I logged onto the local airport’s website and up to ten flights are scheduled to arrive from Buenos Aires (about ninety minutes away) each day for the next month.

I suspected I might know the answer why but asked a local friend what had changed. Her response was rather excitable:

“Javier Milei! His agenda! His reforms! The Argentinians have suddenly got money again and they want to spend it!”.

For most people, economic growth isn’t plotted on a graph or visualised by a pie chart; it’s seen in practical improvements to their lives and standard of living. A nice holiday is a pretty good start. Good luck to Argentina.

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Anyway, that’s my first contribution on Substack. Do let me know what you think and if there’s anything you might like me to write about in future.

Happy New Year.